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Just Compensation for Real Estate
Condemnation
Thomas L. Dettelbach*
No person shall be . .. deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law, nor shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation.'
T HE PURPOSE OF THE REQUIREMENT Of just compensation con-
tained in the above quoted section of the United States
Constitution, where private property is taken for public use, is
to place the financial losses caused through public improvements
on the public rather than entirely upon those who happen to lie
in the path of the project.2 Since the nation is proliferating with
ever-expanding highways and urban renewal programs, and
these programs involve the exercise of the power eminent do-
main, controversies related to fair value for property taken are
numerous. Relatively few cases in modern times reach the Su-
preme Court, but through previous decisions, affirmed or cited
with approval in recent cases, the law regarding just compen-
sation has been firmly established.
Eminent Domain
Being an incident of sovereignty, the right of eminent do-
main requires no constitutional recognition. The requirement of
just compensation is merely a limitation upon the exercise of a
pre-existing power 3 to which all private property is subject. 4
This power exists in favor of the Federal and State Governments
as well as municipal subdivisions of the state and any public or
private corporation vested with a public use, so long as the pow-
* B.S. Ohio State University; Real Estate Appraiser with firm of Herbert
Laronge, Inc., of Cleveland. Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Constitution of The United States, Amendment V.
2 United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U. S. 499, 65 S. Ct. 761
(1944). See generally, Oleck, Cases on Damages, c. 36 (1962); Oleck, Dam-
ages to Persons & Property, c. 21 (1961 rev. ed.).
3 United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513, 518, 3 S. Ct. 346 (1883); United States
v. Carmack, 329 U. S. 230, 241, 67 S. Ct. 252 (1946); 3 Nichols on Eminent
Domain, §§ 8.6, 43 (3d ed. 1965); United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 375,
63 S. Ct. 276 (1943).
4 United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 465, 23 S. Ct. 349 (1903);
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er is exercised when necessary for the public good.5 Regarding
the appropriation by the Federal Government of lands in a State,
it has been held that Congress may authorize that they be taken,
either by proceedings in the courts of the State, with its consent,
or by proceedings in the courts of the United States, with or
without any consent or concurrent act of the State.6
Condemnation
The term "condemnation" is defined as the taking of private
property for public use, with compensation to the owner,7 and
recently has been used to refer to proceedings instituted for the
purpose of exercising the sovereign power of eminent domain.8
It was earlier defined as the "means by which the sovereign may
find out what any piece of property will cost . . . (with) title not
(passing) until compensation has been ascertained and paid." 9
Condemnation has remained basically the same over the years,
though prior to World War II the appropriation of private prop-
erty for public use was largely the result of a physical taking,
without the formality of a condemnation action, leaving the own-
er to a suit for compensation under the Tucker Act'( or in ac-
cordance with procedures outlined under the Lever Act."
Amendment Fourteen
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion prohibits any State from "depriv(ing) any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law... ." When this
Amendment was first enacted, the question arose whether the
above provision gave property owners the same protection of
just compensation as did the Fifth Amendment. The first case
ruled in the negative. 1 2 Shortly afterwards, however, it was held
that even though the State ".... legislature may prescribe a form
of procedure to be observed in the taking of private property for
5 Semenow, Questions and Answers on Real Estate, 61 (3rd ed. 1957).
6 Chappell v. United States, 160 U. S. 499, 510, 16 S. Ct. 397 (1896).
7 Semenow, op. cit. supra n. 5.
8 United States v. Dow, 357 U. S. 17, 78 S. Ct. 1039 (1958).
9 Danforth v. United States, 308 U. S. 271, 60 S. Ct. 231 (1939).
10 Act of March 3, 1887, C. 359, 24 Stat. 505, 28 U. S. C. 1346(a) (2), 1491
(1952).
11 Act of August 10, 1917, c. 53, 40 Stat. 276, 279.
12 Davidson v. Board of Administrators, City of New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97,
105, 24 L. Ed. 616 (1878).
Jan., 1966
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol15/iss1/18
COMPENSATION FOR CONDEMNATION
public use, . . . it is not due process of law if provision be not
made for compensation." 13 Such compensation should be "full,
adequate and just, not excessive or exorbitant." 13a The cited
case of Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co. is recognized as the first incor-
poration of "just compensation" into the 14th Amendment. Even
though this requirement of just compensation has been made
applicable to the States, the rules regarding compensation in the
State and Federal courts are not always the same, and they are
not required to be the same. 14 In the case of Roberts v. City of
New York, 15 junk value was allocated to an elevated structure,
but a high value was attributed to the underlying easement.
The high court held that a "mere underestimate of compensation
to be paid for property taken in condemnation" is neither unfair
nor a denial of due process; the alleged error must be gross and
obvious. Unless the State court prevents the property owner
from obtaining substantially any compensation, its findings as to
damages will not be overruled even though the complainant re-
ceived less than he should have received. 16
Just Compensation-What is it?
The Fifth Amendment contains no definite standards of fair-
ness for just compensation, 17 though the word "just" may be
said to connote the feeling of "fairness" and "equity." 1s At-
tempted definitions of the term have fallen short of providing
quick solutions to problems of compensation, but the general
definition most widely used seems to be, "the full and perfect
equivalent, in money, of the property taken,19 not to exceed mar-
13 Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 236, 17 S. Ct. 581
(1897).
13a Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, supra note 13; A. Backus Jr. &
Sons v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U. S. 557, 18 S. Ct. 445 (1898);
cited with approval in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 4, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 1491(1964) (2 dissents on other grounds) cited with approval in Griggs v. Alle-
gheny County, 369 U. S. 84, 82 S. Ct. 531 (1962).
14 State of Nebraska v. United States, 164 F. 2d 866 (8th Cir. 1947) cert.
den. 334 U. S. 815, 68 S. Ct. 1070 (1948).
15 295 U. S. 264, 55 S. Ct. 689 (1935).
16 McGovern v. City of New York, 229 U. S. 363, 33 S. Ct. 876 (1913).
17 United States v. Cors, 337 U. S. 325, 69 S. Ct. 1086 (1949) dissents by
Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton and C. J. Vinson.
18 Monongahela Navig. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 13 S. Ct. 622
(1893); United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 365 U. S. 624, 81
S. Ct. 784 (1961).
19 Monongahela Navig. Co. v. United States, supra n. 18.
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ket value fairly determined." 20 It seems to be clear that if there
is a taking, compensation must be made to the owners in
money.21 It was established long ago that, generally, compen-
sation should be just to both the condemner and the con-
demnee, 22 and "when the public faith and credit are pledged to
a reasonably prompt ascertainment and payment, and there is
adequate provision for enforcing the pledge, . . .the requirement
of just compensation is satisfied." 23 One expert has suggested
that just compensation can be expressed in terms of the follow-
ing formula:
Just Compensation = Value of land taken plus
Damage to remainder minus
special benefits
24
A better and more widely used formula, however, is the differ-
ence between the value of the property before and after the
taking.25
How Is Just Compensation Determined?
As in most areas of the law, the determination of just com-
pensation is dependent on the particular facts; however, there
are certain basic rules which can be followed in this field. The
rules of compensation are judicial in nature and it is up to the
courts to determine what is or is not just compensation and what
rules are to be applied.26 But where the Federal Government is
involved in the taking, State law cannot be used to determine
just compensation, since the right to compensation is based on
the Federal Constitution, even though Federal Courts are bound
by local procedural laws.2
7
One of the more prevalent methods of establishing just com-
pensation is by use of recent sales of comparable properties,
20 Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299, 43 S. Ct. 354
(1923); United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U. S. 341, 43 S. Ct.
565 (1923).
21 See discussion in Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 51,
194 N. E. 2d 158, rev. on other grounds, 176 Ohio St. 425 (1963).
22 Searl v. School District No. 2, 133 U. S. 553, 10 S. Ct. 374 (1890).
23 Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U. S. 668, 677, 43 S. Ct. 684
(1923).
24 Nichols, op. cit. supra n. 3.
25 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 83 S. Ct. 999 (1963).
26 United States v. New River Collieries Co., supra n. 20.
27 United States v. Miller, supra n. 3.
Jan., 1966
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol15/iss1/18
COMPENSATION FOR CONDEMNATION
which sales are usually confined to a reasonable period prior to
the date of taking, 28 and to properties similar "in their situation,
relative position and other factors relating to value," such sales
being "fair and in the open market." 29 In Ohio, use of com-
parable sales, however, does not include evidence of unaccepted
offers of purchase for any property except the subject property
"even though elicited on cross-examination." " An attempt to
prove value by use of the price paid for property is only admis-
sible as tending to show present value so long as the purchase
was not so far removed in time from the appropriation as to
make such comparison unjust or impossible.31 However, in a
case involving personal property, original cost was termed the
"false standard of the past .... ,, 32
In determining just compensation, mineral and timber re-
sources are to be included in the value, 33 but in Ohio mineral
deposits cannot be determined separately from the land. 34 Re-
production cost is another method of determining value, but is
not a good factor when no one would think of reproducing the
property.3 5 Still another basis is the use of earnings through an
income approach to value, but the period used must be reason-
ably near the date of taking.36 The methods of arriving at just
compensation are many, and, as mentioned previously, will vary
with the particular problems faced in an area. Reproduction
may not be feasible, income may not be present, or sales may be
so few, far between and unstable as to reflect no market what-
soever. These are problems that the court constantly tries to
28 United States v. 63.04 acres, 245 F. 2d 140 (C. A. 2, 1957); Also see
United States v. The Meadow Brook Club, 259 F. 2d 41 (C. A. 2, 1958)
cert. den. 358 U. S. 921, 79 S. Ct. 290 (1958).
29 Ohio Turnpike Commission v. Ellis, 164 Ohio St. 377, 131 N. E. 2d 397
(1955).
30 In re Appropriation of Easement for Highway Purposes, 110 Ohio App.
88, 168 N. E. 2d 436 (1959).
31 In re Appropriation of Easement for Highway Purposes, 118 Ohio App.
207, 193 N. E. 2d 702 (1962).
32 United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U. S.
396, 70 S. Ct. 217 (1949).
33 United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U. S. 111, 58 S. Ct. 794 (1938);
United States v. Klamath & Moadoc Tribes, 304 U. S. 119, 58 S. Ct. 799
(1938).
34 In re Appropriation of Easements for Highway Purposes, 174 Ohio St.
441, 190 N. E. 2d 446 (1963).
35 United States v. Toronto Nay. Co., supra n. 32.
36 Ibid.
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deal with in deciding appropriation contests. The goal is to in-
demnify the owner whose property has been taken by eminent
domain.
37
The Measure of Compensation
Damages are measured by the loss to the owner, not the gain
to the taker. 38 If the property has a special value to the taker
because of its adaptability for his project or a special value to
the owner because of its adaptability to his needs, these elements
are not used to arrive at market value; likewise, an increase in
value because of the government's great need is excluded. 39 Cost
of or investment in a property is not recoverable as such, for the
law protects the market value and not the cost,40 and the owner
is entitled to just and adequate compensation but is not entitled
to realize profit.41 One case held that Congressional authoriza-
tion of Indian occupancy of lands does not equal ownership and
such occupancy may be extinguished without any compensa-
tion.4
2
The "highest and best use" of a property should always be
considered in making a proper evaluation, and "the general rule
is that compensation 'is to be estimated by reference to the uses
for which the property is suitable, having regard to the existing
business and wants of the community, or such as may be reason-
ably expected in the immediate future,' . . . (but) 'mere possible
or imaginary uses, or the speculative schemes of its proprietor,
are to be excluded.' " 43 However, fluctuations in property value
as a result of the legal authorization of a Government project,
or from the starting or finishing of a project, are "incidents of
37 Monongahela Navig. Co. v. United States, supra n. 18; Bauman v. Ross,
167 U. S. 548, 17 S. Ct. 966 (1897); United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745,
67 S. Ct. 1382 (1947), citing Bauman v. Ross with approval.
38 United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 63 S. Ct. 1047
(1943); United States v. Miller, sup-ra n. 3; United States v. Causby, 328
U. S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062 (1946); Roberts v. New York, supra n. 15; United
States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., supra n. 18.
39 United States v. Cors, supra n. 17; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
Co., 229 U. S. 53, 33 S. Ct. 667 (1913).
40 United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, supra n. 38; Olson v. United
States, 292 U. S. 246, 54 S. Ct. 704 (1934).
41 In re Appropriation of Easements for Highway Purposes, supra n. 34.
42 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U. S. 272, 75 S. Ct. 313 (1955).
43 Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, supra n. 13; McGovern v. New
York, supra n. 16; also see Griggs v. Allegheny County, supra n. 13; United
States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, supra n. 38.
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ownership" and any increase or decrease in value because of this
is non-compensable. 44 The rule varies, depending on whether
the property was within the scope of the project from the begin-
ning or was merely adjacent and included by subsequent en-
largement of the project. If the latter, the owner should not be
deprived of the added value to the property, before enlargement,
because of his proximity.
45
Fair Market Value
The normal measure of recovery, where it can be deter-
mined, is the market value of the property.46 Market value has
been defined as "the amount that in all probability would have
been arrived at by fair negotiation between a willing seller and
a willing purchaser," 47 but the following definition appears more
encompassing and meaningful:
Market value (or fair market value) is the amount at which
a property would exchange, for cash, in the current real
estate market, between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
both well informed as to all possible uses to which the prop-
erty is adapted, both motivated by reactions of typical users,
and both allowed a reasonable time to test the market.48
(This presupposes that all rights or benefits inherent in and
attributed to the property were included in the transfer.)
The cost of reproduction of the building, less depreciation,
(discussed supra in determination of compensation) is not the
same as fair market value and is not necessarily a part of fair
market value, but it may be considered in determination of fair
market value in condemnation cases.49
Following are a few of the rules which have been applied
to the determination of market value by the United States and
Ohio courts:
44 Danforth v. United States, supra n. 9; United States v. Miller, supra n. 3.
45 United States v. Miller, supra n. 3.
46 United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, supra n. 38; United States v.
New River Collieries Co., supra n. 20; United States v. Cors, supra n. 17;
United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., supra n. 32.
47 United States v. Miller, supra n. 3; also see Olson v. United States, supra
n. 40; see Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U. S. 1, 69 S. Ct. 1434
(1949).
48 Edmunds, What Constitutes Just Compensation, 27 The Residential Ap-
praiser 11 (April, 1961).
49 In re Appropriation for Highway Purposes, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 580, 187 N. E.
2d 413 (1962).
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1) Market value may indicate the use to which a property
may be readily converted as well as its present use,50
but where there is no probability of a zoning change
within a reasonable time, only the zoned use may be the
basis of market value. 51
2) Special value to the owner is non-compensable, 52 for he
receives only indemnity for his loss,5 3 and, likewise, he
is not constitutionally entitled to a return of his invest-
ment.
54
3) A determination of market value is not unjust even
though the value arrived at is less than the aggregate
values of various interests in the land.
55
In 1959 the Supreme Court was confronted with the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute which de-
nied compensation to owners of property affected by the desig-
nation of a "limited access highway" unless the property was
actually taken.56 Respondents were claiming a property right in
their access to the highway which was to be destroyed. The
State courts had denied present relief to respondent but the
District Court, in Creasy v. Stevens,5 7 issued a general decree
prohibiting the State from proceeding because of "irreparable
harm" facing the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed the
District Court, dismissing on jurisdictional grounds. The dis-
senting opinion conceded the impropriety of the District Court
decree but maintained that plaintiffs were entitled to a declara-
tory judgment determining whether or not the access to a high-
way was a property right and therefore compensable. The dis-
senting view appears the better reasoned position, for a system
of law as is proposed here does not, as the law was intended,
50 Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 25 L. Ed. 206 (1879); McCandless v.
United States, 298 U. S. 342, 56 Sup. Ct. 764 (1936); supported in a strong 4
justice dissent in United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U. S. 222, 76
S. Ct. 259 (1956).
51 In Re Appropriation of Easement for Highway Purposes, 118 Ohio App.
315, 194 N. E. 2d 582 (1963).
52 United States v. Cors, 337 U. S. 325, 69 S. Ct. 1086 (1949); United States
v. Miller, supra n. 3.
53 United States v. Miller, supra n. 3.
54 United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, supra n. 38.
55 Hughes v. City of Cincinnati, 175 Ohio St. 381, 195 N. E. 2d 552 (1964).
56 Martin v. Creasy, 360 U. S. 219, 79 S. Ct. 1034 (1959); Justice Douglas
dissenting in part.
57 Creasy v. Stevens, 160 F. Supp. 404 (W. D. Pa. 1958), revd. 360 U. S. 219
(1959), sub nom. Martin v. Creasy.
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prevent the possible doing of a wrong. Rather, it affords "pos-
sible" relief after the commission of the wrong. This system of
law is not complete, and is inadequate to meet the present needs
of society.
58
The area in which the Supreme Court seems to have ren-
dered the most decisions involving just compensation for real
property relates to water power and flowage right cases. Four
decisions within the past ten years stand out as establishing the
law in this area. The first of these discusses the issue of whether
or not just compensation includes the value of land as a site for
hydroelectric power. (i.e., does it include the value of the water
power?) 5 9 The court, in a 5-4 decision, invoked the theory of
the United States' "dominant power" over navigable streams,
and held that since this power exists, the landowner has no
"right" to the flow of the stream since the Government can grant
or withhold it as it chooses. The court indicates that a different
result would probably be reached if a privately owned stream
were involved. The strong dissent says the highest and best use
must be included (i.e., value due to its riparian character) in
determining the fair market value.
The next case involved the Federal appropriation of timber,
without notice to the owner but in accordance with State law,
which grew on land between the low and high water mark of a
river and which was subject to servitude for use in levee con-
struction. ° The court felt that the Federal Government ob-
tained by "donation" what the State had already appropriated
through legislation. The dissent said that this appropriation,
without giving the owner an opportunity to salvage his property,
was "sheer confiscation."
The third decision was rendered by a unanimous court and
involves the incorporation of a non-navigable tributary as part
of a comprehensive plan of the Federal Government.6' There
was no compensation made to the State agency created to de-
velop power on this tributary for either its loss of water power
rights or its franchise to develop power. The court held that the
58 Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 910 (1907).
59 United States v. Twin City Power Co., supra n. 50, dissenting by Justices
Burton, Frankfurter, Minton, and Harlan.
60 General Box Co. v. United States, 351 U. S. 159, 76 S. Ct. 728 (1956) dis-
sent by Justices Douglas and Harlan.
61 United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U. S. 229, 80 S. Ct.
1134 (1960).
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frustration of an enterprise by exercise of a superior govern-
mental power is not a taking of property.
The minority in the above cases seems to have emerged par-
tially victorious if the fourth case can be a criterion. 62 Here, the
United States acquired a flowage easement by condemnation.
This included a smaller parcel over which respondent owned a
perpetual and exclusive flowage easement which was destroyed
by the appropriation. The court unanimously agreed that there
is no private property in the flow of a navigable stream and
therefore this part was non-compensable; however, the easement
has value not attributable to the flow of the river and this is
compensable. The court said, "the valuation of an easement
upon the basis of its destructive impact upon other uses of the
servient fee is a universally accepted method of determining its
worth." In other words, look at the highest and best use of the
servient land, determine its value and then determine what is
destroyed of that value by the easement.
Fair market value, like just compensation, cannot be simply
defined. The above examples were intended to merely show some
directions which the courts have taken. Every case must be de-
termined on its own fact situation and rare are the cases which
parallel previous decisions.
Date of Valuation
As a general rule, the determinative date for the ascertain-
ment of compensation is the date of taking possession or title,
whichever is earlier.6 3 Where, however, the special equities of
a particular situation require the application of a different rule,
the courts remain flexible. In a recent Ohio case, where the
court found, (1) a substantial decrease in a property owner's
gross income as a direct result of the activities of the City and
Urban Renewal authorities, (2) that the owner was required by
the City to expend considerable money to keep his buildings in
reasonably good condition, and (3) that the City placed a valu-
62 United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 365 U. S. 624, 81 S. Ct.
784 (1961) dissent by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Whittaker and
Black.
63 Anderson v. United States, 179 F. 2d 281, cert. den. 339 U. S. 965, 70 S.
Ct. 1000 (1950); 11,000 Acres of Land v. United States, 152 F. 2d 566, cert.
den. 328 U. S. 835, 66 S. Ct. 980 (1946); United States v. Dow, 357 U. S. 17,
78 S. Ct. 1039 (1958); United States v. 63.04 acres, 154 F. Supp. 198 (E. D.
N. Y. 1957), affirmed 257 F. 2d 68 (2d Cir., 1958); Danforth v. United States,
308 U. S. 271, 60 S. Ct. 231 (1939).
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ation on the property based on values at the time of trial, the
owner was held entitled to receive, as just compensation, "the
fair market value of (the property) as it was immediately before
the City took active steps to carry out the work of the project
which to any extent depreciated the value of the property." 64
Interest
Ordinarily, property is taken under a condemnation suit
upon payment of the money award by the condemner and no
interest accrues. 65 If, however, the property is actually taken
before payment is made, just compensation includes "an amount
sufficient to produce the full equivalent of that value paid con-
temporaneously with the taking." 66 This interest is calculated
from the time payment should have been made to the time it is
actually made. 7 But where the owner and the Government en-
ter into a contract, setting the purchase price and omitting any
mention of interest, the owner cannot recover interest even
though payment is delayed.6 8 It should be kept in mind that the
allowance of interest is only applicable in cases where the basis
of the taking is in the Fifth Amendment or where a relevant
statute exists, but it is not otherwise applicable even where a
statute directs payment of "just compensation." 69
Partial Takings
One of the most difficult areas of just compensation involves
the taking of only a part of a parcel and attaching a fair market
value to that part. The landmark case in this area was decided
prior to 1900,70 but is still the guidepost for present decisions.
That case held that in order to arrive at just compensation where
part of one entire parcel of land is appropriated for public use,
64 City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 190 N. E. 2d 52 (1963).
65 Danforth v. United States, 308 U. S. 271, 60 S. Ct. 231 (1939).
66 United States v. Klarnath and Moadoc Tribes of Indians, 304 U. S. 119,
58 S. Ct. 799 (1938); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 54 S. Ct. 26 (1933).
67 United States v. Rogers, 255 U. S. 163, 41 S. Ct. 281 (1921); United States
v. Highsmith, 255 U. S. 170, 41 S. Ct. 282 (1921); United States and City of
N. Y. v. Benedict, 261 U. S. 294, 43 S. Ct. 357 (1923); Liggett & Myers To-
bacco Co. v. United States, 274 U. S. 215, 47 S. Ct. 581 (1927).
68 Albrecht v. United States, 329 U. S. 599, 67 S. Ct. 606 (1947).
69 United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U. S. 48, 71 S. Ct. 552
(1951).
70 Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 17 S. Ct. 966 (1897); cited with approval
in United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745, 67 S. Ct. 13 (1947).
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all proximate effects of the taking must be considered. This in-
cludes (1) the withdrawal of the part taken from the domain of
the former owner, (2) the damage to the residue by the sever-
ance, and (3) the benefit immediately accruing to the residue
from the beneficial use of the part taken for a particular public
use. Exclusion of any of these factors results in compensation
that is either more or less than just. In these partial takings,
therefore, just compensation includes "any element of value
arising out of the relation of the part taken to the entire tract." 71
So, where the taking of a strip of land closed a private right of
way, an allowance was properly made for the value of the ease-
ment.
72
The basic rules are outlined above, but the issue still arises
as to whether a beneficial use to the part taken can be consid-
ered in the valuation of the remainder, and if it can be, to what
degree. If the benefit is permanent in nature the possibility of
its removal because of the ending of the project is not ground
for eliminating consideration of the benefit.73 By the same token,
where it is possible that the project may end, thus eliminating
the benefit, there should be some consideration given to this in
valuing the remainder. 74 This represents the Federal rule re-
garding consideration of benefits to remaining land. The state
rule presents a "vexed question which has given occasion for
numberless decisions in different states, as well as much legis-
lation." 75 The Fourteenth Amendment provides a basic guaran-
tee that a property owner shall not be deprived of just compen-
sation. This is not to say that he shall receive a positive pecu-
niary advantage from a public project whenever his neighbor
does. Property not taken should be valued in light of the pecu-
liar and individual benefits conferred on it, and it is not a depri-
vation of any fundamental right when a state allows consider-
ation of such benefits as a "set-off," even though the entire
71 United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 375, 63 S. Ct. 276 (1943).
72 United States v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333, 30 S. Ct. 527 (1910); United States
v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., supra n. 62.
73 United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U. S. 411, 46 S. Ct.
144 (1926); Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U. S. 315, 53 S. Ct. 177 (1932) where
land was condemned for park purposes and a fire station was subsequently
erected.
74 Ibid.
75 McCoy v. Union Elevated R.R. Co., 247 U. S. 354, 38 S. Ct. 504 (1918);
also see Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 50 S. Ct. 299 (1930).
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neighborhood receives the same advantages. 7 In Ohio, opinion
evidence as to damages suffered by an appropriation is inad-
missible, but a qualified witness may give his opinion as to the
value before and after the taking, as well as the reasons for such
opinions, and may then give a mathematical calculation of this
difference for the benefit of the jury.77 This method of "before
and after value" is also used in the Federal Courts. 78
Where the owner owns adjoining tracts, one of which is
affected by the taking, there is no constitutional requirement of
payment of consequential damages to the other properties, 79 for
the "severance damage" doctrine has been confined to the partial
taking of a separate and distinct parcel unless ownership in sev-
eral parcels has been so "actually and permanently" used and
integrated as to make the several parcels in fact a separate and
distinct parcel.s0 As a corollary, where there are two separate
but contiguous parcels and one is left untouched by the taking
but is benefited by the improvement, the benefit cannot be used
as a set-off against the compensation for the taking of and dam-
age to the first parcel s.8
Consequential Damages
Under Federal law, consequential or incidental damages are
noncompensable in fixing just compensation.8 2 These noncom-
pensable damages have included properties not actually taken
or suffering a pro tanto taking in a community through which
a contemplated turnpike was to run. 3 Consequential damage
such as destruction of a business,8 4 the expense of moving fix-
76 McCoy v. Union Elevated R.R. Co., supra n. 75; also see Monongahela
Navig. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 13 S. Ct. 622 (1893), which held
that there may not be taken into account any benefit which the owner may
receive in common with all the public.
77 American Louisiana Pipe Line Co. v. Kennerk, 103 Ohio App. 133, 144
N. E. 2d 660 (1957).
78 Aaronson v. United States, 79 F. 2d 139 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
79 Sharp v. United States, 191 U. S. 341, 24 S. Ct. 114 (1903).
80 Campbell v. United States, 266 U. S. 368, 45 S. Ct. 115 (1924).
81 United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 375, 63 S. Ct. 276 (1943).
82 United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372, 66 S. Ct. 596 (1946);
Mitchell v. United States, 267 U. S. 341, 45 S. Ct. 293 (1925).
83 State ex rel. Ohio Turnpike Commission v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107
N. E. 2d 345 (1952), cert. den. sub nom. Balduff v. Ohio Turnpike Commis-
sion, 344 U. S. 865, 73 S. Ct. 107 (1952).
84 Mitchell v. United States, supra n. 82.
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tures and personal property from the premises, or the loss of
goodwill which is derived from the location, are not recoverable
when property is taken in fee. 5 Nor is the United States obli-
gated to pay for the loss of a business opportunity under con-
demnation law."6 By the same token, "just compensation is not
allowable for any unwillingness of the owner to part with his
property, nor for loss of business or future profits .... ,, 87
Where the Government took occupancy of leased premises
for only a part of an unexpired term, just compensation in-
cluded: Is
1) Fair market rental on basis of rental value by long-term
tenant to temporary lessee.
2) Cost of removing stored property.
3) Preparation of space for Government occupancy "includ-
ing labor, materials, transportation, and possibly the cost
of temporary storage and returning goods to premises."
4) "Destruction, damage or depreciation" of fixtures and
permanent equipment.
The above removal, and relocation preparation and depreciation
damages were not allowed where the lease was shorter than the
Government taking period. 9 In a later case involving the tem-
porary taking of a laundry, it was held that loss of going-concern
value (i.e., trade routes) was a compensable taking, but a vigor-
ous four-man dissent failed to see the reason for compensation
in this case and no compensation where the entire lease is
taken.90 A still later case cited the latter case with approval, and
went on to say that in a "temporary taking" market value is not
a certain enough guide to be of practical use.("
Finally, just compensation has been held not to include the
taking of an easement of access when the owner has other, al-
85 United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 65 S. Ct. 357
(1945).
86 United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, supra n. 38.
87 MacLeod, Adequacy of Compensation in Condemnation, 31 The Appraisal
Journal 477 (October, 1963).
88 United States v. General Motors, supra n. 85.
89 United States v. Petty Motor Co., supra n. 82.
90 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U. S. 1, 69 S. Ct. 1434 (1949);
but see Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U. S. 668, 43 S. Ct. 684
(1923) which held good will or going concern value to be noncompensable.
91 United States v. Pewee Coal Co., Inc., 341 U. S. 114, 71 S. Ct. 670 (1951)
dissent by C. J. Vinson, and Justices Burton, Clark and Minton.
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though less convenient, access, 92 or to include attorney's fees and
expenses. 3 There is a sole exception to the rule excluding con-
sequential damages, and this is the allowance of compensation
for a private corporation franchise to take tolls. 94 The exception
was based on the theory that the value of realty is determined
by its productiveness, a theory which is the essence of much of
the law of just compensation.
Conclusion
The law which has been developed regarding just compen-
sation for real property could and does fill volumes. This analy-
sis, primarily based on United States Supreme Court decisions,
is a small part of the existing law, for the majority of the cases
begin in the State courts and never reach the high court. Never-
theless, the Supreme Court has adhered to the law in this area,
without change, for almost as long as there has been a Consti-
tution. The present Court has often cited the landmark cases
outlined here, and has not, as of this writing, overruled one of
those cases. While many areas of the law are undergoing almost
constant interpretation, this area remains solid and firm. While
alterations and refinements have been adopted by the courts, the
fundamental law in respect to just compensation for real estate
condemnation has remained remarkably stable.
92 Rigano v. State of New York, 38 Misc. 2d 480, 236 N. Y. S. 2d 820 (1963).
93 Dohany v. Rogers, supra n. 75.
94 Monongahela Navig. Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S. 312, 13 S. Ct. 622 (1893).
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